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INTEGRATING LEXICAL AND FORMAL SEMANTICS:
GENITIVES, RELATIONAL NOUNS, AND TYPE-SHIFTING 1
Barbara H. Partee, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Vladimir Borschev, VINITI, Moscow
1. Theoretical Background and Issues.
In this paper we discuss the analysis of expressions such as J hn’s team, John’s brother,
John’s favorite movie, Mary’s favorite chair, Mary’s former mansion. Before introducing the
concrete problems, we briefly describe our theoretical perspective.
Our theoretical concern is the integration of formal semantics and lexical semantics,
especially but not exclusively in the traditions of Montague Grammar and the Moscow
School (Apresjan (1994), Mel’èuk (1982), Paducheva (1996)), respectively. We have
proposed (Borschev and Partee (in press)) to modify the Moscow school approach and
represent lexical information in the form of sets of meaning postulates, which may or may not
exhaust the meaning of the given lexical item.  We believe this use of meaning postulates is
consistent with actual Moscow school practice, and it makes it possible to integrate lexical
semantics with the compositional “semantics of syntax” given by formal semantics.  If the
formal semantic interpretation of a sentence is given as a formula of intensional logic in
which lexical items are primitives, and lexical semantics as a set of meaning postulates for
these lexical items, then their integration can be seen as the drawing of entailments from
these sources. This approach is in principle extendable to the integration of semantic
interpretation with contextual and other information as well.
So we semantically represent a sentence or a text as a theory con isting of different sorts
of formulas, i.e. different sorts of axioms and their entailments. By “theory” here, we do not
mean the metalevel linguistic theory, but the set of axioms from various sources plus the
consequences that can be drawn from these axioms, which together constitute the
interpretation of such a sentence in a given context. Such a theory (see Borschev 1996)
characterizes the class of all models that are consistent with the content of the given text, or
of the text together with certain aspects of its context, if the theory includes axioms
representing contextual information. The most general structure (features and constraints) of
such models have to represent what the Moscow School calls “naivnaja kartina mira” ‘the
naive picture of the world’, and what formal semanticists, following Bach (1986) and Link
(1983), call Natural Language Metaphysics or Ontology.
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2This general scheme, particularly the principles governing interactions among axioms
from different sources, has to be investigated with concrete linguistic material. On our model-
theoretic perspective, all of the “axioms” from all of the different sources jointly constrain the
possible models, and their joint effects may account for phenomena ranging from ambiguity
reduction to meaning-shift phenomena such as “coercion”. On this view, cooccurrence
restrictions reflect the sometimes incompatible demands that different elements may make on
the interpretation of the whole. Ambiguities are decreased when not all of the possible
variants provide a consistent (or sufficiently plausible) interpretation. Inconsistency, which
should in principle always result in “anomaly” judgments, may lead instead to type shifting
or other meaning shifts, the complexities of which are one of the main concerns of this paper.
It will probably turn out that the mechanism of axiom interaction is rather complicated, and
may include modifications (shifts) in some axioms in the context of the others.
We do not pretend to have an articulated view of the nature of all the different sorts of
axioms that may play a role in the “theory” of a text, but we will illustrate some of the
possibilities for a few of them.
2. The problem of the genitive “relation”.
The substantive topic to which we are bringing our theoretical concerns is a family of
puzzles concerning the interpretation of the English genitive construction with relational and
non-relational nouns (“John’s father” vs. “John’s team”). The same or very similar problems
arise in corresponding constructions in many other languages, and related problems arise with
the English verb have and its lexical and constructional counterparts in other languages
(Freeze 1992,  Jensen and Vikner 1996, Schafer 1995).
Our starting point is the following data from Partee 1983/1997:
(1) (a)  John's team
(b) A team of John's
(c) That team is John's
(2) (a)  John's brother
(b) A brother of John's
(c)  (#) That brother is John's
(3) (a)  John's favorite movie
(b) A favorite movie of John's
(c)  (#) That favorite movie is John's
Informally, a unified interpretation of genitive phrase “John's” that applies to all of these
cases is that the genitive phrase always expresses one argument of a relation. But the relation
can come from any of three sources: (i) the context2, as i  (1) ("plays for", "owns", "is a fan
of", etc.); this happens when the noun is a plain 1-place predicate; (ii) an inherently relational
noun like “brother”; (iii) an inherently relational adjective like favorite. Th puzzles for
analysis are these: can (and should) examples (1a) and (2a) be given a uniform analysis, and
if so, how? Or does the genitive construction combine differently with plain and relational
nouns, and if so, are these difference predictable from some general principles?
                                                 
2 It may turn out to be better to split this first case into two distinct cases, one being a default preference of the
“genitive” (perhaps better referred to as  “possessive” in English, since this is not a true genitive case)
construction itself for a relation in the family of “owns”, “possesses”, “controls”. But for the time being we are
subsuming  this case under the case of “contextually given” relations.
3In Section 3 we describe two proposals, one from Partee (1983/1997) and the other from
Jensen and Vikner (1994), and outline their differences. In Section 4 we examine the
behavior of the adjective fa orite and other adjectives in the light of alternative approaches to
type multiplicity and coercion. In Section 5 we bring the issues of Sections 3 and 4 together
and consider the interaction of lexicon, compositional interpretation rules, and context in
order to try to find a way to decide between the alternatives. In the end we argue in favor of a
modified version of Jensen and Vikner’s proposal, with open questions remaining about how
the operative principles should be formulated.
3. Two theories of genitives.
The analysis of Partee (1983/1997) posits an ambiguity in the construction, with  the
common noun phrase supplying the relation if it is relational, and with the construction
supplying a “free relation variable” if the common noun phrase is not relational. Jensen and
Vikner (1994) present, within the framework of Pustejovsky (1993), an alternative proposal
according to which the genitive must always combine with a relational common noun
(phrase), coercing a one-place predicate noun to a two-place relational meaning (“team” to an
appropriate sense of “team-of”).
3.1. Partee (1983/1997): Non-uniform genitive, Type multiplicity:“free R” with
CN, “inherent R” with TCN.
A summary of syntax and semantics of the analysis of genitives of Partee 1983/1997 is
presented in (4) below. In the formulas in (4), R is a variable over two-place relations and P
is a variable over one-place predicates. The 8-operator is an “abstraction” operator (see, for
instance, Partee, ter Meulen, and Wall 1990). The 4-operator is a definite description operator
which applies to an open sentence to produce a term which denotes the unique entity which
satisfies the open sentence, if there is one and only such entity, and otherwise fails to denote
anything.
The rules below may be understood as embedded in a fragment of English similar to that
of Montague (1973), enriched with some of the kinds of type multiplicity and type-shifting
argued for in Partee (1987). The categories CN and TCN are both to be understood as
common noun phrases; CN, the normal category of common noun (phrase), is of type <e,t>, a
one-place predicate; examples are t am, movie, dog. TCN (“transitive common noun”) is a
non-standard name for a common noun phrase understood as denoting a two-place relation,
type <e,<e,t>>; examples are brother, teacher, favorite movie. A determiner (DET) combines
with a common noun phrase to make an NP; here we consider only NP’s of type e. There will
be two distinct semantic types of DET which will select for CN’s and TCN’s respectively.
(4)(a)Predicative genitive (is John’s): a one-place predicate, free R only.
Translation of John'st/e = 8x[Ri(John)(x)]  (= Ri(John))
Translation of Fido is John'st/e = 8x[Ri(John)(x)](Fido)  = Ri(John)(Fido)
(b)Postnominal genitive (t am of John’s, teacher of John’s): combines with CN or TCN
to make a CN; free or inherent R.
(i) free R: 8P8x[P(x) & Ri(John)(x)]
team of John’s:   8x[team(x) & Ri(John)(x)]
    (ii) inherent R:   8R[8x[R(John)(x)]]  or equivalently, 8R[R(John)]
teacher of John’s: 8x[teacher(John)(x)]]
(c) Prenominal genitive (John’s team, John’s teacher) is an ambiguous DET: combines
4with CN or TCN to make an NP; free or inherent R; interpretation is function
composition of implicit the with interpretation of postnominal genitive, free or
inherent.
Translation of “inherent R” [John’s]DET =  8R[4z[R(John)(z)]]
 This one combines with TCN, which provides the relation.
John’s teacher:   4z[teacher(John)(z)]
Translation of “free R” [John’s]DET =  8P[4z[P(z) & Ri(John)(z)]]
 This one combines with CN, “fills in” the “free R”.
John’s team:  4z[team(z) & Ri(John)(z)]
Our assumption about the relation between semantics and pragmatics is that in order for a
speaker to felicitously use a sentence whose translation contains a “free R”, the speaker must
have in mind a particular value for the variable, and the speaker must believe that the context
provides enough clues to enable the hearer to identify the value of the variable that the
speaker intends. Partee (1983/1997) assumes that there are no absolute constraints imposed
by the genitive construction on the possible values of R.
3.2. Jensen and Vikner (1994): “Uniform” genitive, type coercion of CN to TCN.
Jensen and Vikner (1994) (henceforth J&V) offer an interesting alternative proposal in
the spirit of Pustejovsky (1993) which they describe as a uniform treatment of the genitive.
Their analysis corresponds to the “inherent R” case of Partee (1983/1997); their claim is that
the genitive always requires a relational common noun phrase to combine with. Their
analysis is given in (5).
(5) (a) Postnominal genitive: 8R[R(John)]
(b) Prenominal genitive: Composition of | the|  with 8R[R(John)]
Their proposal makes crucial use of the notion of coercion: the genitive construction
demands a relational common noun phrase to combine with, and any non-relational noun
must be coerced to a relational reading in order to combine with the genitive. Some nouns are
inherently relational (height, manager); for them no coercion is needed. Some nouns are one-
place predicates but with a lexically given ("default") associated relation (Pustejovsky (1993),
so that coercion by a genitive normally gives a unique relational interpretation unless strong
context overrides (paper, idea, car, nose, chair); these, together with the inherently relational
nouns, yield "lexical interpretations" of the genitive.
For example, the lexical entry for a functional artifact term like chair, according to
Pustejovsky, includes in its “Qualia structure” a specification of its intended use: to sit in.
Then the natural relational reading for chairthat is available through a lexical type-shift is
something like:
(6) 8y8x[chair(x) & sits-in(x)(y)]
Remaining nouns are one-place predicates with no lexically given associated relation; the
use of the genitive construction with them requires contextual support to force a meaning-
shift outside the lexicon, in an unspecified “pragmatic component”, whose effect seems to be
basically the composition of the noun meaning with what we have been calling a "free R"
meaning, resulting in a meaning like "team-of" etc. Such coercions are called "pragmatic
interpretations" of the genitives, and these can also be forced by a sufficiently strong context
for the nouns which normally get lexical interpretations of the genitive. An example of the
latter is a reading of John's parents which may be used when John is a school teacher,
5meaning “the parents who are parents of the children in John’s class”.
3.2.1. “Semantic vs pragmatic” genitive.
One would welcome the possibility of a uniform treatment of genitives, and other work
on type-shifting supports the idea of a grammatical construction causing coercion of the type
of a lexical item. At the end of their Section 2, J&V say that they are giving a uniform
interpretation to the genitive construction and “charging the lexicon with the task of
providing a relational interpretation of all nouns”. But J&V’s analysis does not actually
constitute a uniform treatment of the genitive, since J&V do not claim to have given a
treatment of what they call the “pragmatic interpretations,” but leave them to some other
component. Their “uniform interpretation” claim was only meant to apply to what they see as
the "purely semantic" cases (C.Vikner, p.c.)
3.2.2. Alternative version of Jensen and Vikner (1994).
Our own preference would be for a version of J&V’s analysis in which the genitive
construction uniformly demands a 2-place predicate, and if it finds a one-place argument, that
argument must be coerced into a 2-place one by whatever means are available and “natural”,
sometimes lexical, sometimes pragmatic. J&V (p.c.) suggest potential agreement with this
version; some of our differences may be theoretical differences concerning what the
semantics should “produce” as “output” in the cases of the “pragmatic” readings. (Our
answer: an interpretation that includes a free relation variable in it.) In that case, we could
indeed describe their analysis as involving a uniform genitive that always requires a relational
argument, and triggers coercion of its argument if necessary.
3.3. Summary of differences between Partee 1983 and modified Jensen and
Vikner 1994.
J&V have just one postnominal genitive, the one of category CN/TCN above, so that of
John’s will have the same interpretation whether it occurs in team of John’s, chair of John’s,
or in friend of John’s:
(7)    8R[8x[R(John)(x)]]
Partee (1983) has that interpretation when the genitive combines with an inherently
relational TCN like t acher or favorite movie, but has another interpretation, of category
CN/CN, for genitives combining with non-relational CNs like team or chair, and on this
reading, the genitive itself introduces a free relation variable:
(8) 8P8x[P(x) & Ri(John)(x)]
We can see the difference in the two analyses in part as a difference in where to draw the
line between what comes from the dictionary and what comes from the context3. Let’s
consider three kinds of cases and the different two-way classification that the two approaches
impose on them.
A. Agreed on “inherently relational” nouns like friend, mother, teacher. The two analyses
treat these alike: in John’s teacher, John ends up filling an argument role in the interpretation
of the TCN teacher.
                                                 
3 In Section 5.3. it will emerge that another difference is also important. Within the cases in which we are agreed
that the relation comes from the context, there is still a difference in “where” the free relation variable is located
– within the meaning of the genitive phrase, or within the “expanded” meaning of the common noun phrase.
6B. The disputed “middle case”: one-place nouns (CNs) for which the lexicon provides
information that supports a possible shift to a related relational reading.
(9)chair of Mary’s:
a. Jensen and Vikner:  of Mary’s: 8R[8x[R(Mary)(x)]]
(shifted) chair: 8y[8x[chair(x) & is-sat-in-by()(x)]]
chair of Mary’s: 8x[chair(x) & is-sat-in-by(Mary)(x ]]
b. Partee(1983): of Mary’s:8P8x[P(x) & Ri(Mary)(x)]
      (non-shifted) chair: chair
chair of Mary’s: 8x[chair(x) & Ri(Mary)(x)]]
Jensen and Vikner make this use of the genitive the same as with relational nouns,
shifting (“expanding”) the CN to a TCN by lexical coercion. Partee treats this case as a “free
R” or “pragmatic” case; the choice of lexical item is seen as just one of many contextual
influences on the selection of the relevant “free” relation.
C. Agreed on “pragmatic” or “free R” cases: one-place nouns (CNs) with no special
lexical basis for a coerced shift:Mary’s sky, Mary’s team
We are agreed on the role of the context in these cases, although in Section 5.3. below it
will emerge that the difference in how the “free R” is brought into the construction is
important in ways that argue for J&V’s analysis.
4. Theories of favorite and adjective types.
Trying to decide between the two theories of the genitive leads to interesting questions
about the meaning and "valency" of the adjective f vorite (and the similar but not identical
Russian lyubimyj). Different hypotheses about favorite favor different theories about the
genitive and lead to suggested modifications of both accounts. We will not settle on a
“correct” analysis but explore the kinds of possible explanations that are made available by
our view of meanings as “theories” that draw on interacting “axioms” from multiple sources.
More generally, we see the study of the interactions of compositional and lexical semantics as
a testbed for the adequacy of separate hypotheses about each.
4.1. Partee 1983: non-uniform favorite with simple “likes best”
On the analysis of Partee (1983), favoritecan combine with either a TCN or a CN, always
resulting in a TCN. The basic meaning appears to be the one that combines with a plain CN,
the other is derivable by what is probably a general type-shift rule.
(10)(a) |[favorite1]TCN/CN| = 8P[8y[8x[P(x) & y likes x best out of P]]]
       (b) |[favorite2]TCN/TCN| = 8R[8y[8x[R(y)(x) & favorite1'(R(y))(x)]]]
The effect of these two interpretations is that Mary’s favorite movie, with CN movie, will
pick out the movie that Mary likes best out of all movies, whereas Mary’s favorite teacher,
with TCN teacher, will pick out the teacher that Mary likes best out of all of Mary’s teachers.
74.2. Non-uniform favorite with added relational parameter, “likes best as a P,
as an R”.
It seems4 that there is another semantically obligatory parameter in the meaning of
favorite, one which would be expressed overtly in expressions with ”likes” as an as-phrase:
(11) Which teacher does Mary like best as a teacher/ as a person/ as a ping-po g partner?
This in turn suggests a possible empirical difference between the predictions of the two
approaches to the genitive, to which we will turn in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
First consider the missing parameter in combination with a TCN. We think that Mary’s
favorite teacher normally means “teacher of Mary’s that Mary likes best as a teacher out of
all of her teachers”, with the same relation showing up in all three places. I.e., with a TCN,
we use its inherent R to supply the missing parameter. So the revised meaning of “favorite +
TCN” would be:
(12)   |[favorite2]TCN/TCN| = 8R[8y[8x[R(y)(x) & y likes x as an R better than any other z 
such that (R(y))(x)]]]
And what about “favorite + CN”? For a first hypothesis, let’s suppose that “Mary’s
favorite violinist” means the violinist that Mary likes best as a violinist. This means that with
a plain CN we use its inherent P to fix the missing parameter. Then the definition of Partee’s
TCN/CN version of favorite would be revised as follows:
(13) |[favorite1]TCN/CN| = 8P[8y[8x[P(x) & y likes x better as a P than any other z such
that P(z)]]]
4.3. “Possible Jensen and Vikner” analysis: uniform favorite with coercion.
Favorite may be the only adjective5 which obligatorily produces a TCN output. It was not
clear which of its types on the Partee 1983 analysis should be considered basic. Probably its
more marked type, TCN/CN, should be the basic lexical type for favorite, a marked sort of
adjective, with its more unmarked type TCN/TCN derived as a natural alternative. The
Bittner and Hale constraint discussed below would in fact require this choice.
For J&V it would be reasonable to exclude the type TCN/CN altogether, require all
adjectives to be endocentric (i.e. of some type X/X), and let favorite trigger coercion of the
CN that it applies to form a TCN. We will therefore assume that J&V would prefer to have
just one meaning for favorite, of type TCN/TCN, just as they favor a uniform treatment of the
genitive.
4.4. Coercion analysis: effects on analysis of other adjectives and type-
shifting.
First we review some observations about new from Partee (1983/1997); then we will look
at an alternative view of them suggested by the coercion analysis.
The analysis of such inherently relational adjectives as favoriteuggests taking a second
                                                 
4 Here we draw on discussions with Elena Paducheva and Ekaterina Rakhilina. The status of this additional
parameter needs further investigation; it may not be as obligatory as the domain argument required by best (best
out of what set?), and it may not be as crucial to the debate as we at first thought.
5 Roger Schwarzschild (pers. comm.) suggests that personal, as used in my personal desk, his own personal
airplane, the President’s personal barber, etc. may have the same semantic type(s) as favorite.
8look at traditionally CN/CN adjectives like new. We can distinguish four separate (but
related) types for new.
(14)(a) [new1]t/e : "hasn't existed long" (a new movie)
    (b) [new2]CN/CN: "hasn't been a CN long" (a new movie star)
    (c) [new3]TCN/TCN:"hasn't been TCN-of long" (my new friend)
    (d) [new4]TCN/CN: "hasn't been (free) Ri-of long" (John's new car is an old car.)
The TCN/CN version, ew4, is definable from the TCN/TCN version and a free R as shown
in (21):
(15) new4' =  8P[8y[8x[P(x) & new3'(R)(y)(x)]]]
The coercion idea of Jensen and Vikner suggests the possibility of eliminating the
TCN/CN version of new altogether and accounting for it via coercion of the noun instead;
this would be desirable insofar as CN/CN and TCN/TCN are both natural types (endocentric
modifiers), and TCN/CN a marked type which should be used, if at all, only for lexically
basic meanings like the meaning of favorite.
In the example of (14d), then, the genitive would force the whole CN new car to become
TCN, and the adjective and noun would then most naturally be construed as TCN/TCN and
TCN respectively.
We can then suggest some natural generalizations about adjective meanings and adjective
meaning-shifts.
(16)(a)Basic types for adjectives: t/e (e 6 t) and CN/CN (( e 6 t) 6 (e 6 t)).
 (b)Natural shifts:
(i) from t/e: by conjunction only.
t/e to CN/CN: 8P8x[P(x) & ADJ1(x)]
t/e to TCN/TCN: 8R[8y[8x[R(y)(x) & ADJ1'(x)]]]
(ii) from CN/CN
to t/e:  ADJ2(x) = ADJ1(entity')(x)
to TCN/TCN: ADJ3(R)(y)(x) = ADJ1'(R(y))(x)
Some more general hypotheses and issues concerning type-shifting principles include the
following:
(17) Type-shifting principles and hypotheses.
(a) The functor category normally coerces a shift in its argument(s) rather than the
reverse. (This is just a tentative hypothesis at this point. It may be just one “default” factor
competing with others such as the dominance of the marked, the dominance of closed-class
over open-class items, and the dominance of grammatical constructions over lexical
meanings.)
(b) Bittner and Hale’s constraint. Bittner and Hale (1995) propose the following
9constraint, which is consistent with all analyses that we know of and which we endorse:
Semantic type-shifting operations are required to be type-range preserving i  the
sense that they cannot create any new combinations of a syntactic category with a
semantic type. That is, a type-shifting operator of type <a,b> can apply to a
constituent of type a and syntactic category ê, only if there are constituents of
category êwhose basic meaning is of type b. (Bittner and Hale 1995, p.102)
(c) A functor category can influence the content as well as the type ofit arguments; we
return to this point in Section 5 when we discuss differences in the effects of favorite and the
genitive.
As an illustration of the principle suggested in (17a), we consider the differences between the
demands of the simple determiner a, which requires a plain one-place CN-type argument6,
and the genitive, which forces a relational reading.
(18) (a) a new mother
(b) Mary’s new mother
The indefinite article in (18a) forces an interpretation of n w mother as a plain CN, giving the
reading “person who has not been a mother for long”, i.e. a woman who has recently given
birth to her first child. The genitive Mary’s in (18b), on the other hand, forces a relational
interpretation of new mother, which results in the pragmatically unusual reading “person who
has not been in the mother-of relation to Mary for very long”. A suitable context for (18b)
could be one in which Mary was an orphan who has recently been adopted. In both cases, the
determiner strongly selects for the corresponding type of common noun phrases, coercing a
shift of the common noun phrase interpretation if necessary.
5. Nouns, genitive and favorite: compositional semantics, lexical semantics,
and context.
5.1. In favor of J&V genitive and “Possible J&V” favorite: Uniform types and
coercion.
Initially it seems that favorite might provide an argument for (our version of) J&V’s
treatment of genitive over Partee (1983), assuming our version of what J&V would/should
say about favorite. For consider the case where the genitive combines with a complex CN(P)
like favorite teacher or favorite chair or former favorite teacher, etc.
First consider Mary’s favorite chair. On Partee’s analysis, when we combine favorit
(TCN/CN) with chair (CN), chair doesn’t shift. Favorite introduces a relation itself, making
favorite chair relational (a TCN-phrase). Then we apply the “argument-genitive”, the one that
combines with a TCN. The resulting interpretation is:
(19) 4x[chair’(x) and Mary likes x as a chair better than any other chair.]
On J&V’s analysis, chair has to shift in order to combine with favorite, so presumably in the
default case the “sit-in” relation will be activated by favorite just as it is activated for “Mary’s
chair”. So J&V will have the relation, not the property, in the result.
(20) 4x[chair’(x) and Mary likes x as a chair to sit in better than any other chair that Mary 
sits in.]
                                                 
6 An exception may be the behavior of weak determiners occurring in the complement of have, as discussed in
Landman and Partee (1984) and Jensen and Vikner (1996).
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So the different views about the role of lexical coercion lead to different predictions in this
case. Partee’s analysis says that Mary’s favorite chair is the chair Mary likes best as a chair;
what it means to like something “as a chair” is not further specified, and would have to be
considered a non-linguistic matter.  J&V’s analysis, on the other hand, if they do indeed want
a uniform type for favorite, makes chair shift for favorite in the same way it shifts for the
genitive. They would then predict that the same relational senses that arise with genitives
would also arise with favorite: the lexical default case would be that it’s her favorite chair to
sit in, and if we are in a context where Mary’s chair is the one she photographs, her favorite
chair would be the one that she most likes to photograph.
5.2. Against. “Mary’s movie”and “Mary’s favorite movie”.
But on second look, it does not seem right after all to treat favorite uniformly as
TCN/TCN with the same kind of coercion of a CN argument as occurs with the genitive. The
reason for not wanting to coerce the CN to a TCN comes from examples like (21a) and (21b).
(21) (a)Mary’s  favorite movie
(b) Mary’s movie.
Example (21a) has a very clear meaning that hardly seems context-dependent at all. It
would take a very strong context to get it to mean anything other than simply "the movie
Mary likes best", with its domain parameter understood simply as the set of all movies, or all
movies in some contextually delimited set. No particular relation between Mary and movies
is suggested or required; movie does not seem to be coerced to any TCN reading.
But Mary’s movie s quite a different matter: There is no most obvious lexical relation
that would trigger lexical coercion, but the possibilities would include such things as “acted
in”, “directed”, “rented from the video store”, “reviewed for the local paper”, etc.
The main difference between the two cases is that there need be no shift to any such
relation in interpreting Mary’s favorite movie. It may happen, e.g. if we replace the “neutral”
name Mary by the name of a known director, actor, movie critic, etc., (as in Fellini’sf vorite
movie), that contextual knowledge might indeed favor a shift from simply “likes best as a
movie (to watch) out of the set of all movies” to “liked best (to direct?) out of th  set of all of
his (directed by him) movies”. But even in such a case the shift is not required; Fellini’s
favorite movie can also simply mean the movie he liked best, which need not be one of “his”
movies.
At this point we seem to be left with two possibilities. If the J&V coercion analysis is to
be maintained, we need more fine-grained coercion principles that could involve different
sorts of CN-to-TCN shifts for different coercing functors. Favorite would coerce a CN to a
relation that specifically concerns a manner of evaluating, while the genitive would coerce a
CN to a different class of relations which we would need to try to specify more closely. Or, as
we were initially inclined to think, favorite doesn't coerce a CN at all, and really does have a
TCN/CN reading as well as a TCN/TCN reading, the two readings related to one another in a
systematic way that shouldn't make the posited polysemy too "costly".
5.3. An argument in favor: “Mary’s former mansion”.
A new argument in favor of J&V’s coercion approach can be constructed from examples
like (22).7
                                                 
7 We are grateful to Norvin Richards, who implicitly produced this argument when he asked us how our analysis
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(22) Mary’s  former mansion
Assume that mansion is basically a 1-place noun. We know that former can modify either
1-place nouns (former monastery, former dancer) or 2-place nouns (former wife, former
friend). In the latter case, former acts as a TCN/TCN, modifying the relation expressed by the
TCN; it gets this meaning via the type-shift described in (16bii).
A former mansion, if mansion is 1-place, is something that was once a mansion and no
longer is – it has fallen into ruin, or been badly damaged by a bomb, or converted into an
apartment house, or some other such change. And there is a possible reading of Mary’s
former mansion which fits that sense of former mansion: this thing is still Mary’s, but no
longer a mansion.
The problem is that that is not the only interpretation of Mary’s former mansion, and in
fact in the absence of strong contextual support it is by far not the most likely reading. The
easier-to-get reading implies that it is no longer Mary’s mansion, though it may well still be a
mansion (it need not be; that is unspecified on this reading) – with a free relation R in
“Mary’s mansion”, whose likely value might be “owns” or “occupies”. What makes this fact
a problem for the analysis of Partee 1983 is that on that analysis, without any coercion, the
free relation variable is introduced by the genitive Mary’s, after former has been combined
with mansion: the constituents that combine are Mary’s and former mansion. Mansion stays
1-place, and therefore we get only one reading for former mansion.
On J&V’s coercion analysis, Mary’s insists on having a 2-place relation as the
interpretation of f rmer mansion. I  principle, there are three ways that former mansion could
be derived as a TCN. (i) Leave mansion as a plain CN and former as a CN/CN, first deriving
former mansion by function-argument application as a CN and subsequently shifting
(“expanding”) it to a TCN, filling in a relation such as “owns” or “lives in” as a “free R” in
the shifted meaning. This would give the same “wrong” result as the Partee 1983 approach,
requiring the “former mansion” to no longer be a mansion. (ii) Leave mans onas a plain CN
but shift former to a TCN/CN, with a “free R” incorporated into the meaning of former
analogously to the TCN/CN meaning of new given above in (14d). But it was argued in the
discussion of (14d) that on the J&V approach, we could probably eliminate the possibility of
shifting an adjective into the “marked” type TCN/CN, so this option would probably not be
available in an optimal type-shifting theory. (iii) Shift mansion to a TCN, with incorporated
“free R”, and shift ormer to a TCN/TCN according to the “natural” shifting principle given
above in (16bii).
It would seem plausible that the most “natural” way to achieve a relational reading of
former mansion is the third alternative above. On that alternative, we look for a relation
mansion-of and apply former to that. This gives us the more natural reading, in which we do
not deny that the entity is still a mansion, but only that it is still Mary’s mansion.
It is not yet entirely clear what principles support the claim just made that the meaning
shift given in (iii) is a more natural way to get a 2-place reading for fo mer mansion than that
given in (i), which results in the less likely reading.  Unless we can identify principles that
predict a preference for the third derivation over the first without appealing to differences in
pragmatic preference for one outcome over the other, we have not fully explained how the
coercion approach produces the right result. But it is clear that the Partee 1983 analysis
produces only the wrong result, and the J&V analysis can at least produce both the right and
                                                                                                                                             
would handle John’s biggest team or John’s biggest book; the answer turned out to be that our analysis would
give the wrong results, while J&V’s analysis could handle it correctly.  We have changed the example to
Mary’s former mansion, because the issues are the same and the data seem particularly clear in that case.
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the wrong result, and it seems plausible that further research may be able to show how it
actually favors the right result.
5.4. Conclusions.
Before the discovery of the argument in Section 5.3., our main arguments against J&V’s
analysis were as follows. They claimed to have a uniform analysis of all the genitives; but (a)
it wasn’t really uniform because they also had “pragmatic cases” corresponding to a subset of
Partee’s “free R” cases, and (b) if they analyzed genitives by coercion they should probably
also analyze favorite by coercion and get rid of the “marked” TCN/CN type Partee 1983
assigned to it; but, as argued in Section 5.2.,  favorite doesn’t evoke the same relational
senses as the genitive so coercion doesn’t work uniformly in any case.
As for point (a), J&V (personal communication) have agreed, as noted earlier, that not all
uses of the genitive are to be subsumed under a single uniform analysis. Both we and J&V
have some non-lexically driven cases, where the context has to provide the relation. And then
the main difference is where and how that contextually supplied relation enters the
construction. In Partee 1983, Partee’s “free R” com s in with the genitive construction, as
part of the meaning of John’s, when its argument is a 1-place CN. On J&V’s analysis that
free R shows up in the derived TCN that is produced by coercion from the CN. That
difference was not emphasized in Sections 3 and 4, but in the end has emerged as a very
important one. It is on that issue that the kind of example adduced in Section 5.3 apparently
provides a crucial argument in favor of J&V’s position and against the position of Partee
1983.
As for point (b), J&V are prepared to hold (personal communication) that coercion
needn’t be uniform – the coercing functor can care about more than just the type of its
argument, and the difference between favorite and the genitive should be taken as grounds for
adopting more fine-grained coercion principles. On a Pustejovskian analysis, this might mean
preferences for different qualia roles.  In the case of the genitive versus favorite, it seems that
the genitive favors relations that are (inverses of, in our representations) functions from
objects to people (perhaps with a special preference for “ownership” or “control”-like
relations), whereas favorite favors relations which suggest some use or functional role or
other relation which would provide a basis for evaluating one item as better than another.
Further investigation may show how to sharpen these differences and make them follow from
the semantic content of the possessive construction and the meaning of favorite; such
investigation will be an important part of further examination of the interaction of formal
semantics, lexical semantics, and context. As foreshadowed in hypothesis (17c) above, we are
now prepared to agree that it is not just logical types that the functor cares about.
These conclusions support J&V’s contention that the coercion approa h works better than
the Partee 83 approach. It remains to explain the relation among the still non-uniform
genitives, a study which may be best embedded in a typological context and in combination
with studies of uses of the verb have (Jensen and Vikner 1996). Even more urgently, it
remains to be explained how coercion works and how structural, lexical, and contextual
information interacts in determining what shifts and how. It is clearly not enough to assume
that type requirements by themselves induce a “most natural” meaning shift: even if one
posits that both favorite and the genitive require a TCN, that does not by itself determine
what relational meaning a plain CN will shift to. It appears there is interaction among
“axioms” from multiple sources, lexical, grammatical, and contextual, in ways which require
further investigation of the linguistic and non-linguistic principles involved.
This effort will undoubtedly require integrated study of lexical semantics, formal
semantics, and pragmatics, and the principles of interaction (in both language production and
language perception) among the different components of grammar and the different
13
information sources which influence preferences among grammatically allowable
possibilities.
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